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Abstract
In this paper, a continuous variable B92 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is proposed using single photon added
and subtracted coherent states, which are prepared by adding and subsequently subtracting a single photon on a coherent
state. It is established that in contrast to the traditional discrete variable B92 protocol, this protocol for QKD is intrinsically
robust against the unambiguous state discrimination attack, which circumvents the requirement for any uninformative states
or entanglement used in corresponding discrete variable case as a remedy for this attack. Further, it is shown that the proposed
protocol is intrinsically robust against the eavesdropping strategies exploiting classical communication during basis reconcil-
iation, such as beam splitter attack. Security against some individual attacks, key rate, and bit-error rate estimation for the
proposed scheme are also provided. Specifically, the proposed scheme ensures very small bit-error rate due to properties of
the states used. Thus, the proposed scheme is shown to be preferable over the corresponding discrete variable B92 protocol as
well as some similar continuous variable quantum key distribution schemes.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method by which quantum states and features of quantum mechanics are used to dis-
tribute an unconditionally secure key (see [1–3] for review). A scheme for QKD was first proposed by Bennett and Brassard in
1984, which is now known as BB84 protocol for QKD [4]. This was followed by an entangled state based protocol for QKD
[5] introduced by Ekert in 1991, which later formed the basis of device independence. This protocol involved measurement in
three bases and thus uses six states in contrast to four states used in BB84 protocol. Almost immediately after the introduction
of Ekert’s protocol, in 1992, Bennett established that neither four nor six states are essential to accomplish the QKD task in
a secure manner, and two non-orthogonal states are sufficient to perform QKD [6]. The protocol drew considerable attention
of the community as it successfully provided some fundamental insights into the origin of the security in the schemes of
QKD. This scheme is now known as B92 protocol. In the original form this protocol was designed for discrete variable (DV)
QKD, here we aim to extend it to continuous variable (CV) QKD for certain advantages that CVQKD provides over its DV
counterpart. Before we elaborate on the advantages and limitations of CVQKD, it would be of use to briefly recall the original
B92 protocol.
In the B92 protocol [6], Alice prepares and sends a string of qubits individually prepared randomly in state |0〉 (representing
the bit value 0) or |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 (representing the bit value 1) to Bob. Bob measures each incoming qubit randomly
either in the computational {|0〉, |1〉} or diagonal {|+〉, |−〉} basis, and designates the measured bit as 0 (1) if his measurement
outcome is |−〉 (|1〉). For the measurement outcomes |0〉 or |+〉, he declares the result as inconclusive, and discards these
results. A part of the remaining conclusive bits are used to check eavesdropping and the rest are retained by both Alice and
Bob, thus sharing a symmetric secret key. This protocol is unconditionally secure under an ideal lossless channel. However, it
can be attacked by Eve in a lossy channel using the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [7, 8], which makes this
protocol insecure in extremely lossy channels, thus making it difficult to be practically implemented. A modification of the
B92 protocol, which was robust against the USD attack was introduced in [9], using a non-maximally entangled Bell pair and
two additional decoy states, called the uninformative states. A device independent version of the B92 protocol [9] was also
proposed in the recent past [10] by allowing the entanglement generation in the hands of an untrusted party present between
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Alice and Bob. Recently, B92 protocol was found relevant in designing a quantum private query scheme [11], which was later
shown insecure in lossy channel [12]. Further, an advanced USD attack is also designed for cryptanalysis of B92 scheme [13].
In contrast to the above mentioned DV quantum cryptography schemes, where photon counters are used, a set of CV quan-
tum communication schemes is also proposed in which information is encoded on quadratures and decoded by homodyne or
heterodyne detection (see [14–16] for review). The first set of CV cryptography schemes was proposed using squeezed state
[17], Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlated states [18], and coherent state [19–22]. The initial set of proposals was focused
on encoding discrete quantum key in CV quantum states, such hybrid schemes were later extended to all CV schemes dis-
tributing CV quantum key [23]. The CV quantum cryptography has several advantages over its DV counterpart as it involves
multi-photon pump beams and do not require single photon detectors, which omit the limitations of single photon source and
detector. On top of that, implementation with easily available light source(s) and detector(s), compatibility with the exist-
ing optical communication technology, and advantage of CV schemes at short distances make them preferred candidates for
metropolitan secure networks. Historical development and current status of the CV cryptography can be found in a set of re-
view articles [14, 16, 24, 25]. Because of these advantages of CVQKD, a CV counterpart of the BB84 scheme [4] has recently
been proposed using single photon added and subtracted coherent states (PASCS) [26]. This scheme uses four states analogous
to the corresponding DV BB84 scheme and also involves classical communication at the end to discard the cases where their
choices of quadratures are different (see Ref. [26] for more detail). The security of CV QKD schemes is analyzed in detail (see
[24, 27] for review). For instance, different studies have reported security against general attack [28], composable security
[29], machine learning for parameter estimation [30], using whole raw key for parameter estimation without compromising
security [31]. On the other hand, initial CV QKD schemes have also led to the schemes for measurement device independent
[32], device independent [33], entanglement-distribution-based [34], atmospheric [35], satellite-based [36] CV-QKD as well
as hybrid CV- and DV-QKD [37]. More recently, proposal to completely eliminate information leakage in CV communication
performed over lossy channels has been reported [38], which has no DV analogue. The proposals for CV cryptography are
not restricted to QKD as CV schemes for quantum signature [39], direct secure quantum communication [40], quantum secret
sharing [41], and position-based quantum cryptography [42] are also proposed.
Motivated by the above facts, in this paper, we propose a CV version of the B92 protocol [6], which can be viewed as a
B92 type modification of a QKD protocol [26]. The protocol proposed in this paper is intrinsically robust against the USD
attack, i.e., it does not require any uninformative state or entanglement. Also, unlike the protocol discussed in Ref. [26], the
proposed protocol is intrinsically (i.e., without any additional conditions on any parameters) robust against the beam splitter
attack, too. Such discrete modulation CV-QKD schemes are shown to perform better by using efficient error correction codes
[43].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce PASCS and the mathematical tools that
are used in this work. Section 3 describes the protocol, and Section 5 is dedicated to the security analysis of the proposed
protocol. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Photon added and subtracted coherent states
In this section, we aim to introduce the mathematical tools and the quantum states that will be required to explain the protocol.
To begin with we may note that coherent state, which is usually obtained as the state of the radiation field at the output of
a laser source, is essentially an eigen-ket of the annihilation operator. It can also be described as a displaced vacuum state.
Subsequent photon addition and subtraction on a coherent state leads to PASCS. This state seems physically realizable as the
photon addition and subtraction operations are experimentally feasible (see [44–46] and references therein). A single photon
added then subtracted coherent state |ψ (γ)〉 is defined as
|ψ (γ)〉 = N−1/2γ aˆaˆ†|γ〉, (1)
where |γ〉 is the initial coherent state having an average photon number |γ|2 with a and a† corresponding to annihilation and
creation operators, respectively. Further,Nγ is the normalization constant which can be expressed as
Nγ = |γ|4 + 3|γ|2 + 1.
In what follows, we propose a protocol of QKD using two PASCSs described by Eq, (1) and characterized by γ = α (i.e.,
|ψ0 (α)〉) and γ = iα (i.e., |ψ1 (α)〉) for α ∈ R+.
A phase space description of quantum mechanics was introduced by Wigner in 1932 [47]. As this distribution function
can have negative values (normalized to unity), it is not a true probability distribution function, and is often referred to as
quasidistribution function. Much later, Glauber and Sudarshan introduced the notion of nonclassicality in terms of negative
values ofP function [48, 49], and it was realized that the states having negative values ofWigner functionmust be nonclassical.
The Wigner function for an arbitrary state, with density matrix ρ, is given by [50]
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Figure 1: Contour plots of Wigner functions of (a) PASCS |ψ0 (α)〉 and (b) the corresponding coherent state with α = 0.8.
The gray region in (a) shows the negative values of Wigner function and thus provides a signature of nonclassicality.
W (ζ) =
2
π
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n〈n|Dˆ−1(ζ)ρˆDˆ(ζ)|n〉, (2)
where Dˆ(ζ) = e(ζaˆ
†−ζ∗aˆ) is the displacement operator defined in terms of complex number ζ = ζr + iζi. Here ζr and ζi are
the phase space coordinates corresponding to the position and momentum quadratures, respectively, and |n〉 is the Fock state.
Now, using Eq. (2), we can obtain Wigner function for the PASCS of our interest. Specifically, Wigner function for |ψj (α)〉
is obtained as
Wj (ζ, α) =
2e−2[(ζa−α)
2+ζ2b ]
π (α4 + 3α2 + 1)
{(
α2 − 1− 2ζaα
)2
+ (2ζbα)
2 − α2
}
, (3)
where {a = r, b = i} for j = 0, while {a = i, b = r} for j = 1.
It is already mentioned in the previous section that a CV quantum communication scheme is different from a DV scheme
designed for the same task as it involves homodyne measurement(s). This can be performed by mixing the quantum signal
with a classical beam at a beam splitter and measuring the difference of the currents at two output ports. By controlling the
phase of the input classical beam, we can address one of the quadratures ζr (i.e., position) or ζi (i.e., momentum).
For the sake of completeness, we have also shown the surface plots of the Wigner functions of the PASCS |ψ0 (α)〉 and
coherent state |α〉 with α = 0.8 in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. Clearly, the Wigner function of the PASCS has a negative
region (shown by gray color in Fig. 1 (a)), indicating that the state is nonclassical. Due to applications of two non-Gaussianity
inducing operations, namely photon addition and subtraction, in generation of PASCS, the obtained Wigner function is non-
Gaussian and also shows a shift toward the positive real side as compared to the corresponding coherent state. In a homodyne
detection, one may choose either to measure quadrature ζr or quadrature ζi. In analogy of Fig. 1 (a) obtained for |ψ0 (α)〉,
one can also obtain the Wigner function for PASCS |ψ1 (α)〉. In what follows, we will propose our CV B92 QKD scheme
using PASCS described in this section.
3 Continuous Variable B92 protocol
Our protocol described below is a CV counterpart of B92 protocol. Alice and Bob initially publicly agree upon a positive real
number α. Depending upon that Bob fixes another positive real value for the post selection threshold ζc in the beginning. The
protocol can be described as follows.
1. Alice prepares an n bit random string (KA) and prepares signal pulses in PASCS either as |ψ0 (α)〉 corresponding to
the bit value 0 or |ψ1 (α)〉 for bit value 1 inKA. Subsequently, she sends the sequence SA of the prepared states to Bob.
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2. Bob also prepares a random string KB of n bit. Corresponding to the bit value 0 (1) in KB, he selects to measure
the position (momentum) quadrature of the signal pulses in SA in the homodyne measurement resulting in the real
(imaginary) part of ζ.
3. If Bob performs homodyne measurement on the position (momentum) quadrature and obtains ζr < −ζc (ζi < −ζc)
he designates it as conclusive. Otherwise, he discards the result and terms the corresponding outcome as inconclusive.
4. Bob then declares the coordinates of the retained (conclusive) results, using which both Alice and Bob obtain KRA ∈
KA and K
R
B ∈ KB, respectively, after discarding the bit values corresponding to inconclusive results. Among these
conclusive results, Bob takes a part of it and announces his measurement outcomes and the coordinates of this part.
Alice and Bob then perform the eavesdropping checking on these results, i.e., they count the number of instances when
Alice sent 0 (1) and Bob obtained 1 (0). If the error is within a tolerable limit, they continue to Step 5, else they discard
the protocol and start afresh.
5. Alice and Bob discard the results used for eavesdropping checking and retain the remaining conclusive results KfA ∈
KRA andK
f
B ∈ KRB , respectively, hence obtaining a shared secret key.
At the end of the quantum communication Alice and Bob are expected to share an unconditionally secure quantum key,
but in ideal conditions KfB = K
f
A. Therefore, it is predecided that at the end of Step 5, Bob will flip his key to ensure
K
f
B = K
f
A = K .
Bit error rate (when KfB = K
f
A) is expected to be low due to negligibly small non-zero value of marginal distribution in
the region ζr < −ζc for |ψ0 (α)〉. However, this can be circumvented by using error correction and privacy amplification
[24, 43], we will discuss this in the next section.
4 Information gain per transmitted state
In this section, we are going to calculate the average amount of information Gab (in bits) gained transferred Alice and Bob
every time Alice sends a PASCS through a lossy channel [51], which can be modeled as passing through a beam splitter with
transitivity T and reflectivity R. Without any loss of generality, all the losses can be attributed to the eavesdropping attempts
by Eve.
Suppose Alice transmits |ψj(α)〉 to Bob. The Wigner function of the attenuated signal in this model can be described by
two mode Wigner function of the state after |ψj(α)〉 passes through the beam splitter as
W˜j(ζ, ǫ) = Wj(Tζ −Rǫ, α)×Wj(Rζ + T ǫ, 0). (4)
Here, we assume the other input of the beam splitter as a single mode vacuum state. Also,Wj(ζ, α) is the Wigner function for
the PASCS states sent by Alice corresponding to j = 0 and 1 defined in Eq. (3). Using this the joint probability distribution
can be computed as [26, 51]
Pj(ζx) =
ˆ
W˜j(ζ, ǫ)dζyd
2ǫ, (5)
where x, y ∈ {r, i} : x 6= y. It can further be used to calculate the probability Pj that Bob correctly infers the state |ψj(α)〉
sent by Alice (i.e., gets bit j)
Pj =
−ζcˆ
−∞
Pj(ζb)dζb, (6)
while the probability Pj¯ that Bob wrongly infers the state (i.e., gets bit j¯) is
Pj¯ =
−ζcˆ
−∞
Pj(ζa)dζa, (7)
where notation is same as in Eq. (3). Hence, the fraction of accepted bits racc is given by
racc =
Pj + Pj¯
2
(8)
with factor 1/2 corresponding to the probability that ith term in KA and the same in KB are the same. Further, the bit-error
rate δ per conclusive result can be given as
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Figure 2: (a) Variation of fraction of accepted bits racc, mutual information Iab, average information Gab, and bit-error rate
δ with ζc considering T = 0.7 and α = 0.6. All the parameters for α = 1.2 are shown as function of (b) threshold ζc
considering T = 0.7 and (b) distance considering ζc = 1.
δ =
Pj¯
Pj + Pj¯
. (9)
Therefore, Shannon information between Alice and Bob per conclusive result can be calculated by averaging over Bob’s
measurement outcomes
Iabj =
−ζcˆ
−∞
d2ζ
Pj(ζb) + Pj(ζa)
Pj + Pj¯
{1 + Φ(ζ) log2 Φ(ζ) + (1− Φ(ζ)) log2(1− Φ(ζ))} , (10)
where error function Φ(ζ) =
Pj(ζa)
Pj(ζb)+Pj(ζa)
. Thus, the average informationGab gained by Bob per transmitted state by Alice
is
Gab = Iabracc. (11)
Privacy amplification of the shared key provides a lower bound to the secret information transmitted in one pulse as [52]
Sab = racc (Iab − τ) (12)
at the cost of reduction of the key size by τ = 1 + log2 Pcoll, where collision probability is
Pcollj =
ˆ
d2ǫ
Pj(ǫ|ζc < |ζb|)2 + Pj¯(ǫ|ζc < |ζa|)2
Pj(ǫ|ζc < |ζb|) + Pj¯(ǫ|ζc < |ζa|)
(13)
with PJ (ǫ|ζc < |ζx|) =
−ζc´
−∞
PJ (ζx,ǫ)
Pj+Pj¯
dζx. Variation of fraction of accepted bits racc, mutual information Iab, average informa-
tion Gab, and bit-error rate δ with threshold value ζc are shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b) which shows similar variation as reported
in Ref. [51]. Here, the noteworthy point is extremely low bit-error rate provided by the present scheme (cf. Fig. 2 (b)).
Further, smaller value of racc, and thus Gab, can be attributed to the fact that due to very small errors, reflected through small
bit-error rate, contribution of wrong accepted bits is low as well as only non-unity value of transmitivity T is considered here.
However, the larger value of information transmitted per accepted bit is due to the high value of α (to visualize this compare
Figs. 2 (a) and (b). The same set of parameters is also shown as functions of the transmission distance over an optical fiber
with absorption rate 0.02 and Bob’s homodyne detection efficiency 0.9 in Fig. 2 (c), where one can clearly see the increase in
the bit-error rate and decrease in both information transmitted per accepted bit and average information shared with losses in
the channel. Finally, security of the extracted key can be enhanced by reducing the size of key in privacy amplification.
5 Security analysis of the protocol
The security of the proposed QKD protocol against an adversary will be discussed under three specific attacks. We begin with
the beam splitter attack in which Eve exploits the transmission losses by using a beam splitter. In another attack, Eve may
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intercept the transmitted signal pulses to measure both the quadratures. Finally, we will consider a particular attack referred
to as USD attack which was successfully used to attack the original B92 protocol (DV version of our scheme).
5.1 Beam splitter attack
In the context of CVQKD, a commonly discussed attack strategy is the beam splitter attack or superior channel attack [26,
51, 53]. In the this attack, Eve uses a beam splitter to split the incoming signal pulses from Alice to Bob. She sends one of
the outputs of the beam splitter to Bob, while keeps the other output in a quantum memory. Subsequently, during quadrature
reconciliation at the end of quantum transmission, Bob announces his choice of quadrature measurement and keeps only the
outcomes when both Alice and Bob had chosen same quadratures. During this step, Eve also comes to know the choice of
quadrature by Alice and Bob. Subsequently, Eve performs measurement of the same quadratures in the corresponding pulses
to infer the bit values shared by Alice and Bob.
It is easy to show that the protocol described in Section 3 is robust against the above mentioned attack. This is so because,
to succeed in the beam splitter attack, Eve needs access to the classical information that Alice and Bob share during quadrature
reconciliation. In the proposed protocol, there is no need for this classical communication at the end of the measurement, so
Eve cannot obtain the information accessible to her in the CV-BB84 scheme [26] and looses the advantage of the beam splitter
attack. This observation also establishes supremacy of the proposed CV B92 protocol over the earlier proposed CV-BB84
protocol [26].
5.2 Intercept and resend attack
Though beam splitter attack is not useful for Eve in the present case, she can adopt different strategies. For example, she
may attempt an intercept and resend attack or simultaneous quadrature measurement attack [26, 51]. In this attack, Eve uses
a symmetric beam splitter (with R = T ) to perform homodyne measurements of two different quadratures (say βr and ǫi)
in the two outputs of the beam splitter. Using the measurement outcomes, she prepares and sends a state to Bob, for which
the joint probability distribution Pj(βr, ǫi) is maximum. Both |ψ0 (α)〉 and |ψ1 (α)〉 have independent regions in phase space
with βr ≥ |ǫi| and ǫi > |βr| of area A0, respectively. The probability that Eve will infer the state successfully, given the
incoming state, Pcorr can be computed using Eq. (5) as
Pcorr =
ˆ
A0
Pj(βr, ǫi)dβrdǫi. (14)
Initially, before starting the protocol, Bob chooses a post-selection threshold ζc and Alice chooses the optimum α for a
given fixed bit-error rate δ. Eve sends the correct PASCS only with a probability Pcorr to Bob. Hence, lesser the value of
Pcorr, higher the probability of Eve getting detected by a significant change in the bit-error rate δ or the rate racc of accepted
bits or by a change in the probability distribution of Bob’s quadrature measurements.
5.3 Unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack
This is a version of the intercept and resend attack which is known to be a major drawback for the DV B92 protocol [8].
In the DV B92 protocol, Eve intercepts all the transmitted qubits and measures the state sent by Alice randomly either in
the computational (Z) basis or diagonal (X) basis. If she obtains a conclusive result, she re-prepares and sends the freshly
prepared state to Bob by an ideal channel. On the other hand, if she obtains an inconclusive result, she does not resend
anything and thus mimics a lossy channel. This attack cannot be performed in the proposed CV scenario because in the CV
case, Bob performs homodyne measurement instead of the polarization measurement or the photon number measurement.
Hence, he will always expect some signal coming towards him instead of vacuum. If Eve performs the USD attack on the
protocol described in Section 3 and finds an inconclusive result, she would send a vacuum state and will easily get caught as
Bob will not receive any signal. Therefore, this protocol is robust against the USD attack without any requirement of using an
alternate basis measurements, uninformative states or entanglement [9, 10].
6 Conclusion
A CV counterpart of B92 protocol is proposed here using PASCS. The proposed protocol is shown to be free from the
limitations of the DV B92 protocol, which is prone to USD attack. Due to this fact that the proposed B92 scheme omits the
requirement for any uninformative states or entanglement. On top of that, the proposed protocol is also resistant to all the
eavesdropping strategies which exploit classical communication during basis reconciliation; for instance, it is intrinsically
robust against the beam splitter attack. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides security against some of the individual
attacks and omits requirement of a classical communication channel without compromising with the key rate and bit-error
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rate estimated for other similar CV QKD schemes [26, 51]. We have also established the security of our scheme against other
individual attacks such as intercept and resend attack.
Security of our scheme over collective attacks remains an open problem and will be attempted in the future. The proposed
scheme helps in sharing a discrete key between two parties by encoding it on a continuous quantum carrier and can also be
extended to design an all continuous B92 scheme where continuous key can be shared with the help of a continuous quantum
carrier [23]. With the well-known advantages of CVQKD schemes over DVQKD schemes, this protocols adds some additional
benefits (robustness against certain attacks), and thus provides a potential scheme for practical implementation.
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